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SLIDE 1: INTERNATIONAL TRADE, POLICY AND MARKETING 
1. 
2. 
SLIDE 2: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
This is an introductory outline slide of the two principal discussion topics. 
First, trends in U.S. agricultural trade are discussed with focus on total 
exports, the division of exports among commodity groups, and an identification 
of major importing countries and regions. 
The second general topic concerns factors that are affecting trade currently, 
and will have a significant impact in determining the amount, type and 
destination of future U.S. agricultural trade. Three items affecting current 
and future trade will be discussed in some detail. They are, ( 1) international 
debt, (2) the current GAIT negotiations, and (3) the current economic and 
political changes sweeping the centrally planned economies. Two other topics; 
economic growth, principally in low and middle income countries; and EEC 
1992 integration will be covered as part of the two general themes. 
TOTAL U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 1975/76 - 1988/89 
Over the past fifteen years exports have been on a roller coaster ride 
reversing direction every five years. A sharp upturn in the late 1970s was 
followed by an equally sharp down turn from 1980 to 1985. The past three 
years have witnessed a recovery almost to 1980 levels and probably put us 
back on a longer run trend line. 
Economic forces have driven these sharp swings in export values. In the late 
1970s, petro dollars, low interest rates, and economic growth fueled an 
unprecedented demand for U.S. farm exports at high prices. In the early 
1980s, world recession, high interest rates, mounting debt, and rising world 
food production contributed to lower world prices and the decline in U.S. 
export value. The recovery since 1985 has not been uniform across all 
countries and regions, as some combination of high debt, low growth rates, 
or increased agricultural production in some regions have limited export 
potential while high growth rates in other regions have led to sharply higher 
imports of U.S. farm products. 
The next set of slides are focused on the latest three year period of recovery 
and include an identification of the regions where growth has occurred and 
of the products which have contributed most to the growth. This is followed 
by a longer time period analysis of the same trends. 
1 
SLIDE 3: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
SLIDE: 4: 
1. 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE NEW GROWfH MARKETS 
On this slide, U.S. markets are divided into three main country groups; 
developed countries, developing countries and centrally planned countries. 
Centrally planned countries are limited to communist centrally planned 
countries for this analysis. A fourth category, developed countries less Japan, 
is provided for comparison as well. This is necessary, because, for a number 
of policy reasons, food consumption behavior in Japan is· more similar to a 
middle income developing country than to a developed country. Since Japan 
is our most important market it tends to dominate any group where it is 
included. 
Japan's domination of the developed country group is obvious. When Japan 
is included with this group it is the most important recipient group and 
participated in the past three year recovery. When Japan is excluded, 
developed countries are only half as important and actually decreased their 
imports of U.S farm products during the recovery period. 
Developing countries are a significant and growing market and along with 
Japan and centrally planned countries are primarily responsible for the 
recovery in U.S. farm exports. 
MAJOR U.S. EXPORT MARKETS 
On this slide, markets are organized by geographical region with Japan and 
the USSR listed as separate areas. 
2. Asia, other than Japan is composed primarily of middle and low income 
developing countries. The size and growth of this market stands in sharp 
contrast to the much smaller and slower growing markets in the developing 
countries of Latin America and Africa. This difference is in part from the 
high international debts and associated slow economic growth rates in these 
latter two areas, a topic to be covered later. 
3. Markets in Western and Eastern Europe have not grown during this recovery 
period. 
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SLIDE 5: 
1. 
2. 
SLIDE: 6 
1. 
SLIDE: 7 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
VALUE OF FARM EXPORTS IN FISCAL 1987, 1988, AND 1989 
Another way to look at the recovery period is to identify which commodities 
were most important. Clearly, exports of grains have increased significantly 
in the past three years. This results partly from the availability of surplus 
stocks and partly from the aggressive export enhancement program for wheat. 
Increases in soybean exports have been constrained by lack of sufficient supply 
and increased competition, principally from South America. Exports of 
livestock and products have grown at average levels as have exports of 
horticultural products. 
U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUP, 1975/76 -1988/89 
In this slide, market share (percent of total exports), for each group is shown. 
The trends are clear, grains and soybeans and products were the principal 
export items fifteen years ago. Their share of total exports has declined 
steadily over the years being replaced by increasing export values of livestock 
and horticultural products. The changes are especially pronounced in the last 
five years. 
U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS BY WORLD REGION, 1975/76 - 1988/89 
While the decline in the Western European market and the rise in the Asian 
market are more pronounced in recent years, the shift in market shares has 
been underway for some time. With about equal shares of 30-35 percent in 
the mid 1970s, Asian markets have grown to absorb almost one-half of all 
U.S. farm exports in the past year, while Western European markets now 
account for less than twenty percent. Low debt levels, rapid economic 
development and a small agricultural base are characteristic of many Asian 
growth markets. In Europe, mature high income economies with little or no 
growth in food demand are becoming more than adequately supplied by 
increasing agricultural productivity in a farm sector with strong subsidy 
support. 
Latin America, after a period of rapid market growth during the 1970s has 
stabilized as a market due primarily to high debt levels and low rates of 
economic growth. 
The USSR and Eastern Europe have been a weather driven market 
fluctuating between five and ten percent of U.S. exports. 
About one-half of the exports to African countries are subsidized to some 
extent. 
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SLIDE: 8 MA.TOR U.S. EXPORT MARKETS - 1988/89 
1. Within Asia, specifically Eastern Asia, four countries; Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and China, took one-third of U. S. exports in the past fiscal year. 
They are the first, third, seventh and eighth ranked markets. 
SLIDE: 9 THIRD WORLD DEBT HAS CUT U.S. FARM EXPORTS $3 BIL • .ANNuALLY 
SINCE 1982. 
1. This is the title slide to the section on international debt. While the debt 
levels are usually well known, the magnitude of their impact on U.S. farm 
exports is not fully appreciated, nor is the importance of seeking resolution 
to the debt problems in developing countries adequately recognized. 
SLIDE: 10 EXTERNAL DEBT - 1989 
1. About forty percent of all the debt in developing countries is in Latin 
America, including the three largest debtor countries, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Argentina. Asia has a small debt load in relation to the region's economy. 
Africa has a fairly large debt burden for a very small economic base. Previous 
slides have shown the effect of these debt loads on U.S. export markets. 
SLIDE: 11 THIRD WORLD DEBT HAS CUT U.S. FARM EXPORTS $3 BIL . .ANNuALLY 
SINCE 1982. 
1. There are several economic reasons why high debt loads restrict a countries 
ability to import. First, the need to earn and use foreign exchange (dollars) 
to make interest and principal payments means that a debtor country has to 
increase exports and limit imports in order to free up foreign exchange. In 
the case of Latin America, exports have to exceed imports by more than $60 
billion a year just to meet debt payments. 
2. The focus on export commodities and the need to use foreign exchange 
earnings for debt repayment also results in reduced resources available for 
domestic investment. This in turn slows economic growth which is the 
principal force behind increased demand for food and thus limits consumption 
changes and dampens the need to import. 
SLIDE: 12 BRADY PLAN - THREE PRONGED EFFORT. 
1. The Brady Plan calls for three major initiatives; (1) reduction or write-down 
of a portion of the existing debt and restructuring of existing debt to longer 
terms so that debt payments will not be so burdensome to economic growth, 
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SLIDE: 13 GATI INDUCED CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
1. The Uruguay round of the GATI negotiations was initiated in September of 
1986, and will end in December of 1990. Little progress has been made to 
date. The early U.S. position for complete decoupling was unsuccessful and 
led to the breakup of the Montreal meeting in December of 1988. The 
October 1989 U.S. proposal of 'tariffication' and then a gradual lowering of 
tariffs over ten years has also met with resistance from the EEC and Japan. 
While failures at the multi-lateral trade negotiation level have not met with 
much success, some bi-lateral negotiations have resulted in minor reductions 
in trade barriers. The U.S. - Canada Free Trade Agreement, and the U.S. 
Japan agreement on beef and citrus imports to Japan are examples. 
2. One reason for the difficulty in multi-lateral negotiations is that major 
economic blocs are developing in North America, Western Europe and the 
Pacific Rim. Political pressures within each bloc make it very difficult to 
bring about reductions in farm support systems even though program costs are 
important claims on country budgets and may impede a country's competitive 
position in world markets. Politically, it is easier to use the GATI as leverage 
for internal change as each country or group of countries has to respond to 
world trade pressures. Thus, negotiations will likely succeed in areas where 
internal change is desired and the GA TI can become a vehicle for 
implementing that change. In this scenario, changes will be small and slow 
in coming. 
SLIDE: 14 SOME LIKELY GATI OUTCOMES 
1. We will probably see a modest phase-down of agricultural supports and trade 
barriers. Tweeten has suggested this may be in the 10-25% range as 
measured by Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSEs) 
2. In anticipation of some of these changes, the U.S. will likely want to retain 
export subsidies as a bargaining chip, even though we may not have much 
surplus to subsidize. For example, a possible bargaining situation would have 
the EEC agree to eliminate export subsidies, (which we want), in turn the 
U.S. would accept duties on soybeans and corn gluten feed in the EEC market 
(which they want). 
3. The U.S. policies most vulnerable to adjustment under any GATI negotiated 
agreement to lower support levels would be sugar and dairy policies. 
" 
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SLIDE: 15 UNCERTAINTIES IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES 
1. This is a title slide. The same title will appear on slides 18, 19, and 20 with 
subheadings as these uncertainties are interpreted. Slides 16 and 17 give a 
brief explanation of the position of communism relative to capitalism and the 
economic contradictions that have led to the failure of the communist 
economic system. The following are introductory comments to the discussion 
on centrally planned economies. 
2. The focus on GAIT, EEC economic integration for 1992, and the emergence 
of western economic blocs is being clouded by the economic collapse and 
future uncertainties in many centrally planned economies. As these changes 
unfold, it is possible that major new economic alliances will be forged. This 
will hold important consequences for trade. The most plausible linkage would 
be Eastern and Western Europe, though this could extend to include the 
USSR as well. This could tilt the U.S. more toward the Pacific Rim area for 
trade alliances; eg. as agricultural trade has already shifted; and/ or toward 
a renewed emphasis on the western Hemisphere including Latin America. 
To understand better the roots of the current uncertainty in centrally planned 
economies, a brief explanation of economic systems follows. 
SLIDE: 16 ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
1. A simple listing of the basic economic systems involved in the present 
uncertainty would include feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. 
In reality, the world is currently organized around two basic systems, 
capitalism and socialism. Feudalism was the predecessor to socialism in the 
USSR, while communism is the dream and final step for the USSR and other 
centrally planned economies. The essential differences between the economic 
philosophies of the three systems rests in the ownership of means of 
production and the incentives or rewards for employing these resources. In 
capitalism the heart of the economic system is private ownership and 
initiative. For socialism it is state ownership, and for communism it is 
communal ownership. 
2. The significance of the current malaise in centrally planned economies is that 
socialism, which is the stepping stone to true communism, has failed as a 
viable economic system. State control and ownership of productive resources 
and the associated decision making processes are now being turned more 
toward the capitalist economic model of private ownership and individual 
initiative. This change will be more easily achieved by some than others. 
For example, there is a history of private ownership and associated institutions 
in much of Eastern Europe. Changes there will less difficult. In the USSR, 
a feudal economy was replaced with a socialist state. Much more will need 
to be learned, and the process of economic change will likely be more difficult 
and protracted for the USSR. 
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SLIDE: 17 COMMUNIST PHIWSOPHY - EQUALITY 
1. . The dream of equality - the giving according to abilities and the taking 
according to needs - has crashed on the reality of human nature, where the 
pursuit of self-interest results in the giving of as little as possible (laziness) 
and the talcing of as much as possible (greed). Socialism has attempted to 
harness these traits by a system of watchdogs, heavy decision making 
bureaucracy, and rigid central planning; with the final result of economic 
failure. By contrast, capitalism, with a little social organization, has harnessed 
these human traits into a very productive economic system. 
SLIDE: 18 UNCERTAINI1F.S IN CENmAll.Y PlANNED EcoNOMIE5 - REslRUCIURING OF 1HE 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
1. The restructuring of the socialist economic systems will involve attempts to 
introduce free market forces. As noted earlier, this will be easiest in Eastern 
Europe where some tradition of private ownership and past market economies 
exist. It will be more difficult in The USSR where the socialist economy 
evolved directly from feudalism, and in some developing countries that have 
moved directly from colonialism to state directed economies. 
2. There will be problems in meeting the short run demands for food and other 
commodities and services, as well as meeting the associated aspirations for 
political pluralism. 
SLIDE: 19 l.N:ERrAINnffi IN CENIRAILY ~ ItlNMfS - RJIENiw.1RAIE OR:Rn.Nnffi 
ARE SUBSTANTIAL 
1. In the longer run, the trade opportunities are significant as centrally planned 
economies include one third of the worlds population and are either low or 
middle income countries. As the change to more efficient economic systems 
occurs, growth in income will fuel the demand for improved diets and the 
freer markets will allow this desire to be expressed. This will be very positive 
for U.S. agricultural exports. 
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SLIDE: 20 UNCERTAINTIES IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES - SHORT RUN TRADE 
OPPORTUNITIES ARE FAVORABLE 
1. In the short run, political unrest will force the centrally planned economies 
to attempt to meet demands for improved living standards including more 
food. For example, unmet meat demand in the USSR is estimated at 30-
35%, and the USSR has promised to boost living standards. Barring 
unforseen political problems, we can expect the strong export situation to the 
USSR to continue in the near term. Requests for favored nation status and 
the possibility of some form of food aid to Eastern Europe and/ or the USSR 
may provide additional export opportunities. 
2. China will provide somewhat lower incentives to domestic agriculture, will 
have less foreign exchange to purchase imports, but within import categories 
will afford high priority to food. 
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International Trade, Policy and Marketing 
1. Trends in U.S. Agricultural Trade 
- Total Exports 
- Commodity Shares 
- Importing Countries, Regions 
2. Factors Affecting Future Trade 
- International Debt 
- Uncertainties in Centrally Planned Economies 
- Economic Growth 
- GATT 
- EEC Integration - 1 9 9 2 
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MAJOR U.S. EXPORT MARKETS - 1988/89 
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External Debt - 1 9 8 9 
All Developing Countries 
Latin America 
Asia 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Africa 
Billions of Dollars 
1,100 - 1,200 
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57 
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225 
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Third world debt has cut U.S. farm 
exports $ 3 bil. annually since 1 9 8 2 
- Exports increased to generate 
foreign exchange 
- Imports reduced to free foreign 
exchange for debt repayment 
- Investments reduced, limiting long 
run economic growth and domestic 
consumption 
Brady Plan - Three Pronged Effort 
- Debt reduction and restructuring 
- New funds 
- Economic policy ref or ms -
stimulate growth 
GA TT Induced Changed in 
Agricultural Policies 
1 . Dramatic shift from military confrontation and 
alliances to economic confrontation and 
alliances. 
Canada - U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
EEC economic integration - 1 9 9 2 
Japan - Pacific Rim 
2. GA TT will be used by each to lower farm 
program costs 
Some Likely GA TT Outcomes 
1. Modest phase down of agricultural supports 
and trade barriers 
2. Export subsidies as a bargaining chip; e.g. 
EEC does away with export subsidies - the 
U.S. accepts duties on soybeans and corn 
gluten feed in EEC market 
3. Sugar and dairy policies in U.S. most vulnerable 
to policy adjustments 
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Economic Systems 
Feudalism 
Capitalism - private ownership 
Socialism - state ownership 
Communism - communal ownership 
. . 
Communist Philosophy - Equality 
Dream 
"From each according to abilities" 
"To each according to needs" 
Reality 
From each as little as possible (Lazy) 
To each as much as possible (Greedy) 
Result 
- Watchdog 
- Bureaucracy 
- Central Planning 
- Economic Failure 
. 
. . , 
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Uncertainties in 
Centrally Planned Economies 
1 . Restructuring of the Communist 
Economic System 
- attempts to introduce free market 
forces 
- problems with meeting demand in 
short run 
- associated political instability 
. 
Uncertainties in 
Centrally Planned Economies 
2. Potential Trade Opportunities are 
Substantial 
- combined populations of 1.64 billion people 
(33% of world} 
- living standards and development are low 
by comparison with similar market 
. 
economies 
China compared to Taiwan, Korea, Japan, 
USSR and Eastern Europe compared to 
Western Europe 
. 
, . - .. . 
Uncertainties in 
Centrally Planned Economies 
3. Short Run Trade Opportunities 
Favorable 
- USSR promises to boost living standards 
- Unmet meat demand estimated at 3 0- 3 5 % 
- China will have lower farm incentives, less 
foreign exchange, high priority for grain 
imports 
' . ... . ... 
. 
